Interactive Information Design

Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau () and Tristan Tomala

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information, every equilibrium of the simple game in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states is robust in the sense that it is an equilibrium with larger and possibly infinite and uncountable message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, robust pure strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal form game in which the set of strategies of each designer is the set of outcomes induced by Bayes correlated equilibria in her corporation.

Keywords: Statistical experiments; Splitting games; Sharing rules; Information design; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01791918v3
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Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021, 41 (1), pp.153--175. ⟨10.1287/moor.2020.1119⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Interactive Information Design (2022)
Working Paper: Interactive Information Design (2021)
Working Paper: Interactive Information Design (2018)
Working Paper: Interactive Information Design (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01791918

DOI: 10.1287/moor.2020.1119

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