The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

Julien Combe, Olivier Tercieux () and Camille Terrier
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Olivier Tercieux: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers' applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism.

Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03917996v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Review of Economic Studies, 2022, 89 (6), pp.3154-3222. ⟨10.1093/restud/rdac002⟩

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Journal Article: The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence (2022)
Working Paper: The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03917996

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac002

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