Public Persuasion

Marie Laclau () and Ludovic Renou

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender has to persuade multiple receivers, possibly having heterogenous beliefs, with the same information for all. We show that public persuasion constrains the sender in how he can influence the beliefs of receivers: if the sender wants to influence the beliefs of one particular receiver, he loses all controls over the beliefs of the others. This observation partially generalizes to targeted persuasion.

Keywords: Public; targeted; persuasion; multiple priors; splitting; concavification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://pse.hal.science/hal-01285218v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Public Persuasion (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01285218

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