Adaptive social learning

Christoph March

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper investigates the learning foundations of economic models of social learning. We pursue the prevalent idea in economics that rational play is the outcome of a dynamic process of adaptation. Our learning approach offers us the possibility to clarify when and why the prevalent rational (equilibrium) view of social learning is likely to capture observed regularities in the field. In particular it enables us to address the issue of individual and interactive knowledge. We argue that knowledge about the private belief distribution is unlikely to be shared in most social learning contexts. Absent this mutual knowledge, we show that the long-run outcome of the adaptive process favors non-Bayesian rational play.

Keywords: social Learning; non-Bayesian updating; analogies; adaptation; informational herding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cbe and nep-evo
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00572528v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Adaptive Social Learning (2016)
Working Paper: Adaptive social learning (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00572528

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