Rumors and Social Networks

Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange and Rachel Kranton

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Why do people spread rumors? This paper studies the transmission of possibly false information---by rational agents who seek the truth. Unbiased agents earn payoffs when a collective decision is correct in that it matches the true state of the world, which is initially unknown. One agent learns the underlying state and chooses whether to send a true or false message to her friends and neighbors who then decide whether or not to transmit it further. The papers hows how a social network can serve as a filter. Agents block messages from parts of the network that contain many biased agents; the messages that circulate may be incorrect but sufficiently informative as to the correct decision.

Keywords: Bayesian updating; Rumors; Misinformation; Social networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-ger, nep-mic, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00966234v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS (2018)
Working Paper: Rumors and social networks (2018)
Working Paper: Rumors and social networks (2018)
Working Paper: Rumors and Social Networks (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00966234

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