Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

YingHua He, Gabrielle Fack and Julien Grenet

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex-ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.

Keywords: Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism; School Choice; Stable Matching; Student Preferences; Admission Criteria; College Admissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm, nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-ure
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01215998v4
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2020)
Journal Article: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019)
Working Paper: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019)
Working Paper: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019)
Working Paper: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2017)
Working Paper: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2015)
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