A schematic view of government as regulator and insurer of the financial system

Henri-Paul Rousseau
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Henri-Paul Rousseau: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present a schematic of the interactions between the government as the REGULATOR of financial institutions and the government as the INSURER of financial institutions while taking into account the long-term feedback relationships between the size and the scope of the financial sector and the level of public debt resulting from financial crises over time. The analysis concludes that at certain high level of public debt and size of the expected support of the financial sector by the government, the regulator and /or the central bank may have to "stabilize" the situation, but there may be cases where the support becomes socially "unacceptable."

Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-hme
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