Social Distancing and Risk Taking: Evidence from a Team Game Show

Distanciation sociale et prise de risque: Les résultats d'un jeu d'équipe

Jean-Marc Bourgeon, José De Sousa () and Alexis Noir-Luhalwe ()
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Alexis Noir-Luhalwe: Université Paris-Saclay, RITM - Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation - Université Paris-Saclay

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Abstract: We examine the risky choices of pairs of contestants in a popular radio game show in France. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the show, held in person, had to switch to an all-remote format. We find that such an exogenous change in social context affected risk-taking behavior. Remotely, pairs take far fewer risks when the stakes are high than in the flesh. This behavioral difference is consistent with prosocial behavior theories, which argue that the nature of social interactions influences risky choices. Our results suggest that working from home may reduce participation in profitable but risky team projects.

Keywords: COVID-19; Social Distancing; Social Pressure; Decision Making; Risk; Distance sociale; Pression sociale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm and nep-spo
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Working Paper: Social Distancing and Risk Taking: Evidence from a Team Game Show (2022)
Working Paper: Social Distancing and Risk Taking: Evidence from a Team Game Show (2022)
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