Regulation and Distrust
Philippe Aghion,
Yann Algan,
Pierre Cahuc and
Andrei Shleifer
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government's role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.
Date: 2009-06-17
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00396268
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
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