Does the fight against corruption require international cooperation?

Pierre-Henri Faure

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper explores the role of corruption in a two-country model with fiscal spillovers. In the absence of cooperation on governance issues, countries always have a strategic incentive to appoint policymakers whose aversion to corruption is lower than average. An international agreement is a precondition for placing corruption fighters at the head of governments.

Keywords: Corruption; Fiscal policy; International cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00610523
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