Equilibrium model with default and insider's dynamic information

Luciano Campi (), Umut Cetin and Albina Danilova
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Luciano Campi: CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, FiME Lab - Laboratoire de Finance des Marchés d'Energie - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CREST - EDF R&D - EDF R&D - EDF - EDF
Umut Cetin: Department of Statistics, LSE - LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science
Albina Danilova: LSE - Department Mathematics [London] - LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science

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Abstract: We consider an equilibrium model á la Kyle-Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. In such a market the insider observes \emph{continuously in time} the value of firm, which is unobservable by the market maker. Using the construction of a dynamic Bessel bridge of dimension $3$ in Campi, \c Cetin and Danilova (2010), we provide the equilibrium price and the optimal insider's strategy. As in Campi and \c Cetin (2007), the information released by the insider while trading optimally makes the default time predictable in market's view at the equilibrium. We conclude the paper by comparing the insider's expected profits in the static and dynamic private information case. We also compute explicitly the value of insider's information in the special cases of a defaultable stock and a bond.

Date: 2011-08-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mst
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