To vote or to abstain? An experimental study or first past the poste and PR elections

André Blais, Jean-Benoît Pilet, Karine Van der Straeten (), Jean-François Laslier and Maxime Heroux-Legault
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André Blais: UdeM - Université de Montréal
Jean-Benoît Pilet: ULB - Université libre de Bruxelles
Maxime Heroux-Legault: UdeM - Université de Montréal

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Abstract: We examine through an experimental design how rational and non-rational considerations affect the decision to vote or to abstain in First Past the Post and PR elections. We show that in both types of elections, but particularly so under PR, a majority of subjects do not make the "right" decision, that is, they do not choose the option that is the most beneficial to them, given. We also demonstrate that a social norm such as sense of civic duty plays a bigger role, even in the lab, and particularly so in PR elections. We suggest that civic duty has a greater impact under PR because this electoral system has a more complicated formula, making it more difficult for voters to realize that their vote is unlikely to substantially affect the outcome of the election.

Keywords: Experiments; Voting; First Past the Post; Proportional Representation; Civic Duty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00616823v1
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