Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness In Network Games with Additive Preferences

Yann Rébillé and Lionel Richefort

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: A directed network game of imperfect strategic substitutes with heterogeneous players is analyzed. We consider concave additive separable utility functions that encompass the quasi-linear ones. It is found that pure strategy Nash equilibria verify a non-linear complementarity problem. By requiring appropriate concavity in the utility functions, the existence of an equilibrium point is shown and equilibrium uniqueness is established with a P -matrix. Then, it appears that previous findings on network structure and sparsity hold for many more games.

Keywords: P -matrix; network game; additive preferences; complementarity problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences (2014)
Working Paper: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences (2014)
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