On licensing and diffusion of clean technologies in oligopoly

Idrissa Sibailly
Additional contact information
Idrissa Sibailly: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, LEI - Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle - Centre de Recherche en Économie et STatistique (CREST)

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Clean technologies implemented by polluters subject to environmental regulation are often developed and patented by specialized technology suppliers. This paper investigates the impact of the environmental regulation stringency on the diffusion of patented clean technologies when the polluters (i.e. the potential licensees) compete in imperfectly competitive markets. We show that the polluters' willingness to pay for clean technology and the diffusion of such technology (i.e. the extent to which it is privately disseminated through licensing) depend not only on the regulatory stringency and the technological efficiency, but also on the polluters' competitive environments. More stringent regulations (e.g., higher carbon taxes) or increased technological efficiency (e.g., supported by more R&D subsidies) do not necessarily induce more diffusion of efficient clean technologies. Indeed, as the returns to implementing a clean technology increase, so do the technology supplier's incentives to sell fewer licenses so as to extract more rent from each of its licensees.

Keywords: Clean technology; Environmental Regulation; Oligopoly; Licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ino and nep-tid
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00911453
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00911453/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00911453

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().