Excess control rights, bank capital structure adjustment and lending

Laetitia Lepetit, Amine Tarazi and Nadia Saghi-Zedek

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We investigate whether excess control rights of ultimate owners in pyramids affect banks' adjustment to their target capital ratio. When ultimate control rights and cash-flow rights are identical, banks increase their capital ratio by issuing equity and by reshuffling their assets without slowing their lending. However, when control rights exceed cash-flow rights, banks are reluctant to issue equity to increase their capital ratio and, instead, shrink their assets by mainly cutting their lending. A deeper investigation shows that this behavior is only apparent in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights. Our findings provide new insights in the capital structure adjustment process and have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel III.

Keywords: Dynamic capital structure; bank lending; pyramids; excess control rights; European banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-ger
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://unilim.hal.science/hal-00967892v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Excess control rights, bank capital structure adjustments, and lending (2015)
Working Paper: Excess control rights, bank capital structure adjustment and lending (2015)
Working Paper: Excess control rights, bank capital structure adjustments, and lending (2015)
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