MAJORITY MEASURES

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures— paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates that are based on comparisons—lead to another method. It is unique in agreeing with the majority rule when the electorate is "polarized" and meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority not defeat an intense minority. It accommodates any number of candidates and avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes.

Keywords: measuring; ranking; electing; majority rule; Condorcet consistency; tyranny of majority; intensity problem; majority judgment; majoritygauge. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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