Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior

SeEun Jung (jungseeun@gmail.com) and Radu Vranceanu

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Abstract: This paper reports results from a real-e ort experiment in which men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a real-eff ort task. Each participant receives an equal share of the team's output. Workers who perform better than their partner can punish him/her by imposing a fi ne. We manipulate the teams' gender composition (man-man, man-woman, and woman-woman) to analyze whether an individual's performance and sanctioning behavior depends on his/her gender and the gender interaction within the team. The data show that, on average, men perform slightly better than women. A man's performance will deteriorate when paired with a woman, while a woman's performance will improve when paired with a woman. When underperforming, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; if sanctioned, men tend to improve their performance, while women's performance does not change.

Keywords: Gender studies; Real-e ort task; Team production; Performance; Punishment; Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gen, nep-hrm and nep-soc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-01171161
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior (2017)
Working Paper: Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01171161

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