UNANIMOUS IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE FOR APPROVAL MECHANISMS

Matias Nuñez and Dimitrios Xefteris

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We design the class of (indirect) Approval mechanisms which allow the players' strategies to coincide with the subsets of the outcome space. By focusing on the single-peaked domain, we prove that: a) Each of these mechanisms is characterized by a unique equilibrium outcome, and b) for almost every implementable welfare optimum (outcome of a social choice rule), including the Condorcet winner alternative, there exists an Approval mechanism that unanimously implements it. That is, Approval mechanisms help a society achieve every feasible welfare goal, and, perhaps more importantly, they promote social coherence: The implemented outcome is approved by everyone.

Keywords: Indirect Mechanisms; Nash Implementation; Strategy-proof; Unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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