Discontent with taxes and the timing of taxation: experimental evidence

Radu Vranceanu, Angela Sutan and Delphine Dubart
Additional contact information
Delphine Dubart: ESSEC Business School

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper reports results from a linear sanction cost variant of the power-to-take game, with implications for tax policies. We compare a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system with an ex-post taxation system in which payroll taxes are collected at the end of the fiscal year. Dissatisfaction with taxation, as proxied by the sanction in the power-to-take game, is significantly higher in an ex-post taxation system compared with the PAYE system. However, in anticipation of the higher sanction, the "tax authority" will not apply lower taxes in the former system. Communication does not decrease dissatisfaction in a significant manner, and it is not used extensively by participants.

Keywords: Power-to-take game; Experiments; Tax systems; Dissatisfaction with taxes; Pay-As-You-Earn; Fiscalité; Impôt sur le revenu; Prélèvement à la source; Effet de dotation; Expérience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pbe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-01282724v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://essec.hal.science/hal-01282724v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Discontent with taxes and the timing of taxation: experimental evidence (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01282724

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().