Harmful transparency in teams

Kanti Parimal Bag () and Nona Pepito ()
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Kanti Parimal Bag: Department of Economics - NUS - National University of Singapore
Nona Pepito: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ESSEC Business School

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Abstract: In a two-period continuous effort investment game as in Mohnen, et al. (2008), we demonstrate that peer transparency can be strictly harmful. This contrasts with Mohnen et al.'s result that transparency, through the observability of interim efforts, induces more effort and is thus beneficial if team members are inequity-averse. If, instead, preferences are standard utilitarian, the marginal benefit is decreasing and marginal cost is increasing in a player's own effort, then players' collective and individual efforts are strictly less with transparency than under non-transparency.

Keywords: Transparency; team; perfect substitution; free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-sea
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