Some Strategic Aspects of Private Information: An Experimental Study

Andrés Salamanca () and Olga Manrique Chaparro ()
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Andrés Salamanca: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Olga Manrique Chaparro: UNAL - Universidad Nacional de Colombia [Bogotà]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper we experimentally analyze the use of private information in a class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. We analyze whether the information disclosure by the informed players, and its use by the uninformed players, matches the theoretical predictions. We consider two games that differ according to the amount of information that the informed player should optimally disclose: in the first game, the informed player should entirely conceal his information. In contrast, in the second game the informed player should fully disclose his information. We find that the flow of information is higher than predicted in the first game and lower than predicted in the second game. However, the use of information is strictly higher in the second game than in the first one. Uninformed subjects tend not to use the revealed information in the first game, and seem to misinterpret the revealed information in the second game.

Keywords: Repeated games; incomplete information; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01305213v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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