Efficient extension of the Myerson value

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus and Frank Huettner
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André Casajus: Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Frank Huettner: Leipzig Graduate School of Management

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Abstract: We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where the graph does not necessarily affect the productivity but can influence the way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage values that are efficient instead of values that are component efficient. For CO-games with connected graphs, efficiency and component efficiency coincide. In particular, the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) is efficient for such games. Moreover, fairness is characteristic of the Myerson value. We identify the value that is efficient for all CO-games, coincides with the Myerson value for CO-games with connected graphs, and satisfies fairness.

Keywords: communication graph; fairness; efficiency; efficient extension; Shapley value; Myerson value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Efficient extensions of the Myerson value (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient extensions of the Myerson value (2015)
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