Conditional Random Dictatorship and the Value of a Bayesian Cooperative Game

Andrés Salamanca Lugo ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We present and analyze a theory of cooperative bargaining under asymmetric information, based on the equity principles of the conditional random dictatorship—choosing with equal probability one of the individuals to act as a dictator under the participation constraint of the other players. Our approach leads to a unified bargaining solution that has as special cases the Shapley value in transferable utility games and the Maschler-Owen consistent value in non-transferable utility games. This solution is shown to be the smallest possible set satisfying two axioms: one of these axioms states what the solution should be for the class of problems where conditional random dictatorship yields an efficient outcome, and the other axiom relates the solutions of a problem to the solutions of its extensions.

Keywords: Cooperative games; incomplete information; strong solution; random dictatorship; virtual utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01511327v3
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-01511327v3/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01511327

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().