Asymmetric Awareness and Heterogeneous Agents

Antoine Dubus

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: I consider the principal-agent model with asymmetric awareness and introduce heterogeneity of the agents on their aversion to effort. I discuss the optimal contract and market structure in a market with an aware principal and unaware agents. When the principal faces two types of agents, one being more effort-averse than the other, the contract he proposes either pools them, separates them, or excludes the more effort-averse agents of the market depending on their proportion. In a first-best world, all the agents remain unaware. In a second-best one, the principal increases the awareness of the agents, to a level which depends on the nature of the contract.

Keywords: Economics of Contract: Theory; Unawareness; Asymmetric and Private Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01521487v3
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Journal Article: Asymmetric awareness and heterogeneous agents (2020)
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