An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services

Damien Besancenot and Radu Vranceanu

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Abstract: The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians' decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.

Keywords: Regulation.; Equilibrium search; Medical fee dispersion; Dual market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Working Paper: An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services (2017)
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