A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information

Andrés Salamanca Lugo ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined H-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted-utility transfer procedure. We construct a three-player cooperative game in which Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory, 13, 1984, pp. 69-96] generalization of the Shapley NTU value does not capture some "negative" externality generated by the adverse selection. However, when we explicitly compute the H-solution in this game, it turns out that it prescribes a more intuitive outcome taking into account the informational externality mentioned above.

Keywords: incomplete information; virtual utility; Cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01579898v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information (2020)
Working Paper: A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information (2018)
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