EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

"Facta non verba": an experiment on pledging and giving

Gilles Grolleau (), Guillermo Mateu, Angela Sutan and Radu Vranceanu
Additional contact information
Guillermo Mateu: BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals' endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.

Keywords: Charity giving; Pledge; Commitment; Communication; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-02799567v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://essec.hal.science/hal-02799567v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: “Facta non verba”: An experiment on pledging and giving (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: "Facta Non Verba": an experiment on pledging and giving (2018)
Working Paper: " Facta non verba ": an experiment on pledging and giving (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02799567

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02799567