A Model for Dual Healthcare Market with Congestion Differentiation

Damien Besancenot, Karine Lamiraud and Radu Vranceanu

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The French market for specialist physician care has a dual legal structure: physicians must exclusively work in sector 1 and charge regulated fees or in sector 2, where they can freely set their fees. Patient out-of-pocket payments in sector 2 are partially covered by private insurance. The primary differentiating factor between both sectors is the number of patients per specialist, which in turn directly affects the overall quality of the service provided. We built an equilibrium model to analyse both specialists decisions about which sector to work in, and patients choice of physician and therefore sector. More specifically, the model allowed us to study the effect of changes in prices and economy-wide patient-to-specialist ratios on profits and patients utility associated with the services provided in each sector.

Keywords: Dual market; Congestion; Regulation; Balance billing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur and nep-hea
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-03028437
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://essec.hal.science/hal-03028437/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A model for dual health care market with congestion differentiation (2023)
Working Paper: A model for dual health care market with congestion differentiation (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03028437

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().