Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity

Renato Gomes and Andrea Mantovani
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Renato Gomes: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Online intermediaries greatly expand consumer information, but also raise sellers' marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent disintermediation, some platforms adopted price parity and anti-steering provisions, which restrict sellers' ability to use alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban these provisions has been at the center of the policy debate, but, so far, little consensus has emerged. As an alternative, this paper studies how to cap platforms' commissions. The utilitarian cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should charge net fees no greater than the informational externality it exerts on other market participants.

Keywords: Platforms; Price parity; Regulation; Commission caps; Extreme value theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03629525v1
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Related works:
Working Paper: Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity (2022)
Working Paper: Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity (2020)
Working Paper: Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity (2020)
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