Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals

Andrea Attar (), Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser ()
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Andrea Attar: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse

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Abstract: We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as first raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)'s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents' game.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms; Equilibrium Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-09-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (2023)
Working Paper: Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (2023)
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