Do different people report the same social norms?

Geoffrey Castillo, Lawrence Choo and Veronika Grimm
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Veronika Grimm: FAU - Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg = University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

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Abstract: If the Krupka-Weber (2013) norm-elicitation task captures pre-existing social norms, then the elicited norms should be independent of one's role in a game or one's social preferences. We test this idea in a complex game that features rich interactions. We find that different people, even when they have conflicting incentives, report the same social norms. Our results further validate the use of the Krupka-Weber task to measure social norms.

Keywords: social norms; norm elicitation; laboratory experiment; methodology; ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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