Stable and Extremely Unequal

Alfred Galichon (), Octavia Ghelfi and Marc Henry
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Alfred Galichon: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, NYU - NYU System
Octavia Ghelfi: NYU - NYU System
Marc Henry: Penn State - Pennsylvania State University - Penn State System

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Abstract: We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.

Date: 2021-08-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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