Persuading a Wishful Thinker

Victor Augias () and Daniel Barreto ()
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Victor Augias: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Daniel Barreto: Département d'économie - UPP - Université Pascal Paoli

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Abstract: We analyze a model of persuasion in which Receiver forms wishful non-Bayesian beliefs. The effectiveness of persuasion depends on Receiver's material stakes: it is more effective when intended to encourage risky behavior that potentially lead to a high payoff and less effective when intended to encourage more cautious behavior. We illustrate this insight with applications showing why informational interventions are often ineffective in inducing greater investment in preventive health treatments, how financial advisors might take advantage of their clients overoptimistic beliefs and why strategic information disclosure to voters with different partisan preferences can lead to belief polarization in an electorate.

Keywords: Non-Bayesian persuasion; Motivated thinking; Overoptimism; Optimal beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hea and nep-mic
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