Cooperation and ethical choices through an experimental approach

Coopération et choix éthiques: une approche expérimentale

Ngoc Thao Noet () and Serge Blondel
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Ngoc Thao Noet: GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: Using a contingent valuation approach over 114 subjects, we assess the degree of cooperation and explain the factors underlying ethical choices. Implementing the prisoners' dilemma and public good games reveals a correlation between the amount of the ethical premium and the degree of cooperation. We identify factors that increase this cooperation, such as the frequency of interactions with individuals. The more cooperative individuals are, the higher the ethical premium. In addition, individuals naturally seek to cooperate. The more the game is repeated, the higher the degree of cooperation. According to the items, the degree of contribution is lower when dilution of responsibility occurs.

Keywords: cooperation; ethical values; public good game; prisoners' dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-exp and nep-gth
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