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Experimental evidence on the "insidious" illiquidity risk

Damien Besancenot and Radu Vranceanu

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper brings experimental evidence on investors' behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur, investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower than the default probability of the first illiquidity default.

Keywords: Coordination game; Illiquidity risk; Threshold strategy; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06-21
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00602107v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Experimental evidence on the ‘insidious’ illiquidity risk (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Experimental Evidence on the ‘Insidious’ Illiquidity Risk (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk (2011) Downloads
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