Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence

Stéphane Robin (), Agnieszka Rusinowska and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Stéphane Robin: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Marie Claire Villeval: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We provide experimental evidence of workers' ingratiation by opinion conformity and of managers' discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers' performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal payoffs. In the Ingratiation treatment, workers can change their opinion after learning that held by the manager. In the Random treatment, workers can also change opinion but payoffs are assigned randomly, which gives a measure of non-strategic opinion conformism. We find evidence of high ingratiation indices, as overall, ingratiation is effective. Indeed, managers reward opinion conformity, and even more so when opinions cannot be manipulated. Additional treatments reveal that ingratiation is cost sensitive and that the introduction of performance pay for managers as well as a less noisy measure of performance increase the role of relative performance in the assignment of payoffs, without eliminating the reward of opinion conformity.

Keywords: Ingratiation; opinion conformity; favoritism; discrimination; social distance; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00694160v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
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