An assessment of Incentive Regulation in electricity networks: The story so far

Haikel Khalfallah ()
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Haikel Khalfallah: équipe EDDEN - PACTE - Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Network regulation is playing an active role in a context of restructuring energy systems for long term transition to a smart grid. Regulation of network companies' activities should consider both cost efficiency objectives and other objectives such as quality and network innovation. It is in this context that incentive regulation tools are discussed and assessed in this paper. The aim is to show their key features and how they could be aligned with the main regulation goals. This paper concludes that they should be considered as complementary tools to address conflicting regulatory aspects in an efficient manner.

Keywords: incentive regulation; electricity; cost efficiency; quality; innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-net and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00931301v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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