Non-verbal feedback, strategic signaling and non- monetary sanctioning: new experimental evidence from a public goods game

Adam Zylbersztejn ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by which feedback may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves aversion to others' expressed disapproval. The presence of feedback is found to foster pro-social behavior. The data favour the non-monetary sanctioning explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis.

Keywords: Public go o ds game; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Feedback; Signaling; Non-monetary sanctioning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01098775v1
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Related works:
Chapter: Nonverbal Feedback, Strategic Signaling, and Nonmonetary Sanctioning: New Experimental Evidence from a Public Goods Game (2015)
Working Paper: Non-verbal feedback, strategic signaling and non-monetary sanctioning: new experimental evidence from a public goods game (2015)
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