Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity
Arnaud Cheron,
Pierre-Jean Messe and
Jérôme Ronchetti (jerome.ronchetti@hotmail.fr)
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
This paper develops an equilibrium search model that allows rms to invest in worker's health. Heterogeneous health endowment of the employee is not observed by the employer, and rms also di er regarding their productivities. We emphasize that wage and health expenditure policies of the employer are tightly related, and show how those policies relate to rms' type. A noticeable implication is that there is an ambiguous relationship between wage earnings and health expenditures supported by fi rms.
Keywords: wage; health; public policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-hea and nep-ias
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Journal Article: Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity (2015)
Working Paper: Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity (2014)
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