A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation

Kenan Huremović

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper we study a situation in which agents embedded in a network simultaneously play interrelated bilateral contest games with their neighbors. Spillovers between contests induce complex local and global network effects. We first characterize the equilibrium of the game on a given network. Then we study a network formation model, introducing a novel but intuitive link formation protocol. As links represent negative relationships, link formation is unilateral while link destruction is bilateral. The unique stable network topology is a complete K-partite network with partitions of different sizes. Stable networks exhibit properties that are in line with empirical and theoretical findings from other disciplines.

Keywords: network formation; game on network; contest; structural balance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01154676v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A noncooperative model of contest network formation (2021)
Working Paper: A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation (2020)
Working Paper: A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation (2015)
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