Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior

Jean-François Laslier

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior.

Keywords: Alternative vote; Manipulation; Behavioral voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01168670v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior (2016)
Working Paper: Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of `sour grapes’ behavior (2016)
Working Paper: Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of `sour grapes’ behavior (2016)
Working Paper: Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01168670

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