Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting

Cyril Chalendard

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper identifies opportunities for improving the performance of revenue-collection authorities. To detect and combat fraud, we argue that revenue-collection authorities should, notably in the absence of reliable third-party information, exploit non-usual sources of information. Specifically, our micro-level study of customs evasion provides evidence that using any internal or external available source of information facilitates customsenforcement. Estimates highlight that exploiting historical data and/or relying on an information provider - a pre-shipment inspection company - significantly reduces evasion in Cameroon. The potential endogeneity of pre-shipment inspections is addressed by using instrumental variables. Results are robust to a variety of additional checks.

Keywords: Use of internal information; External Information acquisition; Customs enforcement; Tax evasion; Pre-shipment inspections. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01179445v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Use of Internal Information, External Information Acquisition and Customs Underreporting (2015)
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