Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs

Emilie Dargaud and Armel Jacques

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.

Keywords: Collusion; antitrust policy; leniency programs; multimarket contact; organizational form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-com and nep-ind
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01199268v1
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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2017)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2017)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2016)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2016)
Working Paper: Endogenous firms’ organization, internal audit and leniency programs (2015)
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