Voluntary Provision of Public Knowledge Goods: Group-Based Social Preferences and Coalition Formation

Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Paolo Melindi-Ghidi and Willem Sas
Additional contact information
Tom Dedeurwaerdere: UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain
Willem Sas: KU Leuven - Catholic University of Leuven = Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper we develop a private-collective model of voluntary public knowledge production, where group-based social preferences have an impact on coalition formation. Our theoretical model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences such as 'group belonging' or 'peer approval' influence stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large scale surveys of Free/Libre/Open-Source software developers (David and Shapiro, 2008), previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable, but mixed coalitions.

Keywords: public knowledge goods; coalition formation; private-collective model; group belonging; peer approval; open source software (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-knm, nep-net and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01224007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01224007/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Voluntary Provision of Public Knowledge Goods: Group-Based Social Preferences and Coalition Formation (2015)
Working Paper: Voluntary provision of public knowledge goods: group-based social preferences and coalition formation (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01224007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().