Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences

Mostapha Diss (), Ahmed Doghmi () and Abdelmonaim Tlidi
Additional contact information
Mostapha Diss: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abdelmonaim Tlidi: ENSA Marrakech - École nationale des sciences appliquées de Marrakech

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we determine a certain equivalence among these theories.

Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Maskin monotonicity; Private good economies; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01226803v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01226803v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2016)
Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01226803

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().