Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes

Mostapha Diss and Ahmed Doghmi ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability that a given voting rule picks out the Condorcet committee, given that such a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections: The Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox which occur when a member of an elected committee leaves. In doing so, using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, we extend the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in two directions. First, our paper is concerned with the probability of the paradoxes no matter the ranking of the leaving candidate. Second, we do not only focus on the occurrence of these paradoxes when one wishes to select a committee of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates but we consider more values of k and m. Abstract The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k−Plurality, k−Negative Plurality, k−Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability that a given voting rule picks out the Condorcet committee, given that such a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections: The Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox which occur when a member of an elected committee leaves. In doing so, using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, we extend the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in two directions. First, our paper is concerned with the probability of the paradoxes no matter the ranking of the leaving candidate. Second, we do not only focus on the occurrence of these paradoxes when one wishes to select a committee of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates but we consider more values of k and m.

Keywords: Multi-winner voting rules; committee; Condorcet committee efficiency; paradoxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01285526v1
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Journal Article: Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (2016)
Working Paper: Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (2016)
Working Paper: Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes (2016)
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