Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath
Jérôme Hergueux (),
Nicolas Jacquemet (),
Stéphane Luchini () and
Jason Shogren
Additional contact information
Jérôme Hergueux: D-GESS - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences [ETH Zürich] - ETH Zürich - Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich]
Stéphane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Working Papers from HAL
Abstract:
Real economic commitment (or the lack of it) of others affects a person's preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation (by 33%)– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior.
Keywords: WorkingPublic good game; Social Preference; Truth Keywords: Public good game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hpe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01379060v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath (2022) 
Working Paper: Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath (2022) 
Working Paper: Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath (2022) 
Working Paper: Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath (2022) 
Working Paper: Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath (2016) 
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