Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games

Lauren Larrouy and Guilhem Lecouteux

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players' capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We show in particular that those beliefs need not be ratifiable, and therefore that rational players can form action-dependent beliefs.

Keywords: action-dependent beliefs; simulation; prior beliefs; mindreading; choice under uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-neu
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01469136v2
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01469136v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games (2017)
Working Paper: Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01469136

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().