Group Targeting under Networked Synergies

Mohamed Belhaj () and Frédéric Deroïan ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.

Keywords: multi-agent contracting; network; synergies; aggregate effort; optimal group targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01790947v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: Group targeting under networked synergies (2019)
Working Paper: Group targeting under networked synergies (2019)
Working Paper: Group Targeting under Networked Synergies (2018)
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