Competition among Securities Markets

Pierre Hautcoeur, Amir Rezaee and Angelo Riva
Additional contact information
Amir Rezaee: ISG - ISG International Business School [Paris]

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study the causes and the consequences of two regulatory changes affecting the competition between the transparent Parquet and the OTC-like Coulisse markets in Paris at the turn of the 20th century. First, we provide evidence supporting the interest group theory to explain regulatory changes. By using these changes as natural experiments, we show then that competition widens bid-ask spreads while monopoly makes them narrower. These results are in line with recent literature questioning the effects of "dark" competition: a transparent monopoly could be more effective than competition if the latter involves opaque markets.

Keywords: Spreads; Paris Stock Exchange; Market microstructure; Reforms; Regulation; Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-fmk
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01863942v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01863942v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01863942

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().